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The 5th Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit that took 
place in Brussels on 24 November 2017 will be 
remembered first and foremost for its reduced 
ambitions and its cautious declarations. The EU missed 
yet another opportunity to come up with a new 
narrative that would accommodate the European 
aspirations of some of its Eastern neighbours. EU 
member states abstained from taking a stance on the 
future strategic perspectives of the EaP, thus 
underlining once more the latter’s unpredictability as 
well as the divide between EU countries when it comes 
to the EaP’s medium- to long-term aims. Yet, greater 
clarity is precisely what the EU has to provide to its 
more reform-minded Eastern neighbours if it wants to 
be serious and credible regarding its alleged objective 
of being a transformative power in the region.  
This policy brief offers an overview of the main 
outcomes of the EaP Summit and discusses some of 
the events that led to the summit’s modest results. It 
then goes on to critically discuss the recent shift in the 
EaP, which sees the EU prioritizing sector-specific 
cooperation at the expense of norms and values 
promotion. It is argued that the EU's seemingly 
unambitious and sobering approach in favour of 
sector-specific regulatory convergence might offer 
unsuspected potentialities. At the same time, it draws 
attention to the multiple limitations of such a narrow 
and technocratic approach and points out that the 
EaP’s shift towards greater transactionalism can only 
provide temporary solutions due to the currently 
unfavourable geopolitical scope conditions in the EU’s 
Eastern neighbourhood.  
The shifting Eastern Partnership narrative: from ‘easy 
game’ and ‘play with fire’ to ‘take it or leave it’ 
Soon after the launch of the EaP in 2009, the EU 
portrayed its new bi-multilateral framework as a won 
game. Unprecedented high popular support for EU-
Executive Summary 
> The November 2017 Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
summit in Brussels underscored the EU’s recent 
shift towards focusing mainly on politically non-
sensitive sector-specific cooperation in its  Eastern 
neighbourhood. This new approach results from 
the absence of political and economic reforms and 
unfavourable geopolitical conditions in the region.  
> Sobering and unambitious as it may seem, the EU’s 
new EaP policy might offer unsuspected 
potentialities, achieve stronger sectoral links and 
have an actual impact on people’s daily lives while 
maintaining a geopolitical balance.  
> At the same time, the focus on sector-specific 
cooperation might slow down the EU-inspired 
transformation process and diminish the EU’s role 
as a key player in EaP countries.  
> Taking into consideration the limitations of 
functional cooperation and its inability to confront 
the considerably disruptive challenges on the 
ground, this new approach cannot be but 
temporary in nature.  
> Currently stuck between a rock and a hard place, 
the EU will eventually have to take a clearer stance 
regarding the future of the EaP. Only relying on 
horizontal technical ‘network governance’ as a tool 
for rule transfer will not substantially advance the 
situation in the Eastern neighbourhood. In the long 
run, the challenges EaP countries are faced with 
require a well-structured and politically 
sustainable strategy.  
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induced Europeanization in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia 
and Armenia made the EU constantly extend its offers, 
from time to time even irresponsibly playing with hints 
at accession perspectives. The prospect of unlocking 
cooperation with Belarus and the positivism towards 
Azerbaijan made everyone believe that EU normative 
power and the corresponding existence of democratic 
governance promotion tools would positively and 
durably influence the domestic situation in EaP 
countries. Simultaneously, Russia’s growing scepticism 
towards the EU’s increased presence in the shared 
neighbourhood was most often either disregarded or 
ignored entirely by EU policy-makers until the outbreak 
of the Ukraine crisis in 2013. 
Over time, however, the EU’s Eastern neighbours 
proved to be a source of constant disappointment for 
Brussels, as its prescribed reforms failed to generate 
tangible results. The defeat of Saakashvili’s party in the 
2012 Georgian parliamentary elections called into 
question the future of Georgia’s political trajectory, 
while Belarussian President Lukashenko’s and Azeri 
President Aliyev’s civil liberties’ and human rights’ 
record kept worsening. In 2013, Moldova struggled with 
political and corruption scandals within its governing 
pro-European coalition even before the banking fraud 
scandal emerged in late 2014. This marked the 
beginning of the end of the country’s perception as an 
EaP frontrunner. The domestic political situation 
worsened ever since, in spite of the EU’s efforts to keep 
Moldova on the track of reforms. The EU’s illusions 
regarding the success of the methods used to advance 
its EaP agenda were completely shattered at the Vilnius 
Summit in 2013 when Ukraine and Armenia refused to 
sign the Association Agreement. Clearly, these events 
triggered an unprecedented crisis, leading to a ‘play 
with fire’ of sorts in a neighbourhood that was initially 
destined to become a stable and prosperous “ring of 
friends” (Prodi 2002).  
From that point onwards, the EU began to reconsider its 
approach towards its Eastern neighbours, a process that 
culminated in the 2015 revision of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the adoption of a much more 
pragmatic and less ambitious discourse. As it became 
apparent that EU-induced processes of reform in EaP 
countries would not bring about the same positive 
results that the Central and Eastern European countries 
joining the EU in 2004 and 2007 experienced (Frapi & 
Pashaeva 2012), Brussels opted for a more tailored and 
adaptive approach. This is rooted in the realization that 
political elites in EaP countries are more interested in 
reaping the benefits of financial assistance than in 
engaging in deep and swift political transformation. 
Moreover, the EU had to learn the hard way that 
security is not exclusively about transformative power 
and capacity-building, but almost entirely about 
geopolitics and Russia’s uncompromising assertiveness.  
Today, almost ten years after the EaP was launched, it 
has become apparent that the initial ‘one size fits all’ 
approach has not delivered the desired outcome and 
therefore been abandoned. The EU is no longer willing 
to praise corrupt Eastern political leaders just because 
they have a pro-European discourse, and it has started 
to demand from the neighbours to truly honour their 
commitments before asking for more. 
The 5th EaP Summit – charting a pragmatic way 
forward 
The 5th EaP Summit itself is an embodiment of the 
pragmatic and sobering approach that the EU has 
recently embarked upon and demonstrates its blatant 
lack of a broader vision that could revitalize and render 
more effective its efforts to promote democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law. The EU missed yet 
another opportunity to come up with a new narrative 
for the Eastern neighbours’ European aspirations and 
offer them more tangible incentives. Already before the 
summit, the idea to upgrade the EaP into an EaP+ and 
to ‘recognise’ the countries’ membership aspirations, as 
requested by Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, was 
dismissed. Tensions among EU member states existed 
even with regard to simply ‘acknowledging’ the 
European perspective of Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine, as formulated in the Riga Declaration 
(Konstanyan 2017). The Brussels Joint Declaration 
merely reconfirms elements and principles embodied in 
past declarations and stipulates only the firm intention 
to carry forward the commitments taken at previous 
summits and in bilateral agreements (Pigni 2017).  
Instead of developing new and innovative forms of 
interstate cooperation, the summit’s outcomes 
demonstrate the EU’s decision to focus on politically 
non-sensitive, sector-specific cooperation. As a matter 
of fact, this shift is also reflected in the wording of the 
different summit declarations ever since 2009. Whereas 
in the early declarations “reform”, “security”, 
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“sustainable development” and “economic integration” 
featured most saliently, the Brussels Summit Joint 
Declaration emphasizes “aviation”, “education”, 
“youth” and “energy” (Kachka  & Yermolenko 2018). 
The sector-specific “gains”, summed up as the “20 
deliverables for 2020”, revolve around financial 
instruments for SMEs, the extension of the EU’s Trans-
European Transport (TEN-T) network to Eastern 
partners by 2030, investments in energy efficiency, 
increased advantages of trade with the EU, reduced 
roaming tariffs, support for job creation in digital 
industries, the creation of a Think Tank Forum and the 
adoption of a youth package. Furthermore, a 
Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement 
(CEPA) and a Common Aviation Area Agreement were 
signed with Armenia. The CEPA presents a fresh start in 
deepening EU-Armenia relations, given the geopolitical 
constraints Armenia is faced with (Kostanyan & 
Giragosian 2017). Thus, its commitments undertaken in 
the areas of justice, freedom and security are rather 
extensive. Yet, the agreement is less ambitious than the 
Association Agreement that was supposed to be signed 
in 2013, as it does not contain a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area and entails relatively 
weak conditionality mechanisms. Moreover, a visa 
liberalization dialogue with Armenia was not initiated 
either. Generally, the EU’s new, more pragmatic 
approach is not only reflected in the sectors it prioritizes 
but also in the actors it targets. The EU’s involvement of 
civil society, media, businesses, parliaments and other 
stakeholders prior to the summit demonstrates its 
intention to transcend mere intergovernmental 
relations and reach out to broader segments of society.  
As a consequence, the new post-Brussels EaP 
represents a shift from an ‘either-or’ to a transactional 
‘pick and choose’ approach that neither closes the door 
for the pro-European aspirations of EaP partner 
countries nor aims at harming their relations with 
Russia. The EU’s new approach also underlines that the 
discourse in Brussels and its attitude towards the 
neighbours has changed as the initially strong 
commitment and enthusiasm, discernible in 2009, gave 
way to a feeling of fatigue and frustration. This is 
accompanied by a change in mind-set among EU 
decision-makers towards assuming that the neighbours 
should implement the existing agreements first before 
asking for new offers (Shagina 2017). This development 
can be explained by the slow and unsteady progress 
regarding political and economic reforms in the 
neighbourhood.  
The currently unfavourable geopolitical scope 
conditions in Eastern Europe add to this sense of fatigue 
and frustration. The Ukraine crisis has proved that the 
EaP finds itself in a contested normative space and that 
the civilizational choice between the EU and Russia that 
EaP countries seem to be faced with represents a 
serious dilemma. Russia has demonstrated its 
willingness to use even military means to prevent EaP 
countries’ integration into the EU. These realities leave 
the EU with few options and position it almost literally 
between a rock and a hard place. In order to soften the 
effects of this development, Brussels tries to square the 
circle by maintaining a sort of presence in the EaP 
countries while not stepping on Russia’s toes. This goes 
hand in hand with the EU’s departure from its initial 
idea to differentiate between Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Belarus on the one hand, and Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine on the other. Instead, EaP partner countries are 
now given the opportunity to deepen their relations 
with the EU according to their ability and desire 
regardless of their civilizational and foreign policy 
orientations, or the nature of their political systems 
(Konstanyan 2017). 
The silent power of sector-specific cooperation 
Despite the downscaled ambition that functional 
cooperation embodies, the EaP’s seemingly 
unambitious focus on functional cooperation and the 
prioritization of sector-specific regulatory convergence 
might also hold some potential. The envisaged, 
supposedly more integrated, participatory, cross-
sectoral and results-oriented cooperation rationale may 
be able to provide politically non-sensitive incentives 
that could translate into quick wins, have an actual 
impact on people’s daily lives and contribute to an 
overall more secure and stable neighbourhood. This has 
already been debated for quite some time as an 
alternative to membership-related incentives in a 
context where political accession conditionality is 
missing (Lavenex 2014). This so-called ‘governance 
model’ of democracy promotion builds upon an 
understanding of the ENP less as a foreign policy but 
rather as a regional structure of functional integration 
between the EU and its neighbours in different policy 
sectors. Through functional cooperation in ‘multiple 
channels of interaction between external actors and 
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domestic state and non-state actors’ (Langbein 2014) at 
the level of, for example, public administration, spill-
over effects could emerge that lead to legal 
approximation and the transfer of the EU acquis.  
The model is seen as a separate tool of democracy 
promotion, which is different from traditional 
instruments of top-down political conditionality, as it 
also addresses public officials working in the 
administration of the targeted countries. If successful, it 
goes beyond legal approximation via formal rule 
adoption: through the participation in cooperation 
frameworks, state officials in partner countries can 
become acquainted with democratic governance and 
apply the transferred norms in everyday administrative 
practice (Freyburg & Lavenex 2018), eventually leading 
to socialization and a change of behaviour, at the end of 
which implementation is more likely to emerge. 
Moreover, the application of conditionality in the 
various networks of functional cooperation between 
the EU and its neighbours could complement traditional 
mechanisms of conditionality.  
Yet, the possible benefits of sector-specific cooperation 
should not obscure the undisputed need for a more 
encompassing narrative that could lead the way once 
partner countries have fulfilled their contractual 
obligations. This is of crucial importance if the EU 
desires to be a true transformative power, prevent 
disappointment and preclude EaP partner countries 
from orientating themselves further towards Russia. 
For example, considering the current debate in Ukraine 
regarding the establishment of a customs union, the EU 
will inevitably have to take a clear stance at some point. 
Also, it will have to discuss EaP partners’ further 
integration into the emerging European digital market 
and the EU’s gas (ENPSOG) and electricity markets 
(ENTSO) to help the countries achieve energy 
independence and promote mutually beneficial energy 
cooperation (Wilson 2017).  
Moreover, one must not ignore existing obstacles to the 
success of functional cooperation and thus the many 
realpolitik considerations that haunt the EaP. First, as 
functional cooperation is based on EU norms related to 
transparency, participation and accountability, 
adaptation costs for ruling elites in the EaP countries are 
very high. A genuine and profound democratic 
transformation in sectors which are essential for their 
power base, such as the electoral, judicial and public 
administration sector, would undermine their primary 
goal of regime survival. Therefore, the regimes in 
partner countries are likely to continue operating in a 
half-hearted way as far as reform implementation is 
concerned, and are bound to further dilute the 
commitments imposed on them by the EU.  
A second factor that can limit the efficiency of 
functional cooperation is resistance against ‘linkage’ 
(Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). Functional 
cooperation jeopardizes wide-spread corruption at 
public sector level, regularly used to advance business 
and other individual interests to the detriment of the 
public good in most EaP countries (European 
Committee of the Regions 2017). This increases the 
probability of tendencies to limit, delay or undermine 
strong interdependence of relevant sectors between 
the EU and EaP countries. Such cases of resistance to 
EU-induced reforms can already be observed in all EaP 
countries,  regardless of their level of EU integration or 
contractual obligations. This is specifically visible with 
regard to the public integrity reform in Moldova and the 
decentralization reform in Ukraine. However, to date, 
the EU has been able to minimize at least to some 
extent such clientelist practices, especially in Georgia, 
but less so in Moldova and Ukraine. 
Conclusion and future perspectives  
The EaP’s new focus on politically non-sensitive sector-
specific cooperation is the result of the absence of 
political and economic reforms and current geopolitical 
scope conditions in the neighbourhood. Sobering and 
unambitious as it may seem at first sight, the EU’s 
approach should not necessarily be perceived only as a 
step back in its commitments towards the Eastern 
neighbourhood. As constant dripping wears away the 
stone, the EU’s envisaged policy of taking seemingly 
small steps might produce stronger sectoral links and 
have an actual impact on people’s daily lives while 
maintaining a geopolitical balance.  
At the same time, this new approach might slow down 
EU-inspired transformation processes and diminish the 
EU’s role as a transformative power and key player in 
the EaP countries, thus generating unknown 
consequences for the development of democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights. Taking into consideration 
these limitations of functional cooperation as well as 
the considerably disruptive challenges EaP countries 
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are faced with, this new approach cannot be but 
temporary in nature.  
As a result, following the EaP Summit in Brussels, the EU 
finds itself between a rock and a hard place: ‘muddling 
through’ and focusing on transactionalism is bound to 
be a decent, and probably the only viable way forward 
for the time being. At the same time, the EU cannot 
indefinitely beat around the bush, believing that it can 
get away without positioning itself and without 
becoming more assertive and also politically mature as 
a foreign policy actor in the neighbourhood. In the long 
run, the EU must switch off the survival mode, define 
what it wants and what it is ready to offer to its Eastern 
partners in a well-structured and politically sustained 
strategy, stand up for its values and conditionalities and 
find internal cohesion to follow the adopted line in spite 
of the many challenges that the countries face. Only 
relying on horizontal technical ‘network governance’ as 
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